Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising Auctions by Feldman, Jon et al.
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
61
20
52
v1
  [
cs
.D
S]
  8
 D
ec
 20
06
Budget Optimization in Search-Based Advertising Auctions
Jon Feldman ∗ S. Muthukrishnan † Martin Pa´l ‡ Cliff Stein §
February 1, 2008
Abstract
Internet search companies sell advertisement slots
based on users’ search queries via an auction. While
there has been a lot of attention on the auction pro-
cess and its game-theoretic aspects, our focus is on
the advertisers. In particular, the advertisers have
to solve a complex optimization problem of how to
place bids on the keywords of their interest so that
they can maximize their return (the number of user
clicks on their ads) for a given budget. We model
the entire process and study this budget optimiza-
tion problem. While most variants are NP hard, we
show, perhaps surprisingly, that simply randomizing
between two uniform strategies that bid equally on all
the keywords works well. More precisely, this strat-
egy gets at least 1 − 1/e fraction of the maximum
clicks possible. Such uniform strategies are likely to
be practical. We also present inapproximability re-
sults, and optimal algorithms for variants of the bud-
get optimization problem.
1 Introduction
Online search is now ubiquitous and Internet search
companies such as Google, Yahoo! and MSN let
companies and individuals advertise based on search
queries posed by users. Conventional media outlets,
such as TV stations or newspapers, price their ad
slots individually, and the advertisers buy the ones
they can afford. In contrast, Internet search com-
panies find it difficult to set a price explicitly for
the advertisements they place in response to user
queries. This difficulty arises because supply (and
demand) varies widely and unpredictably across the
user queries, which range from specialty vacations to
mundane home supplies; furthermore they have to
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price slots for billions of such queries in real time.
Instead, they rely on the market to determine suit-
able prices by using auctions amongst the advertisers.
It is a challenging problem to set up the auction in
order to effect a stable market in which all the parties
(the advertisers, users as well as the Internet search
company) are adequately satisfied. Recently there
has been systematic study of the issues involved in
the game theory of the auctions [4, 1, 2], revenue
maximization [9], etc.
The perspective in this paper is not of the Inter-
net search company that displays the advertisements,
but rather of the advertisers. The challenge from an
advertiser’s point of view is to understand and in-
teract with the auction mechanism. The advertiser
determines a set of keywords of their interest and
then must create ads, set the bids for each keyword,
and provide a total (often daily) budget. When a user
poses a search query, the Internet search company de-
termines the advertisers whose keywords match the
query and who still have budget left over, runs an
auction amongst them, and presents the set of ads
corresponding to the advertisers who “win” the auc-
tion. The advertiser whose ad appears pays the In-
ternet search company if the user clicks on the ad.
The focus in this paper is on how the advertisers
bid. For the particular choice of keywords of their
interest1, an advertiser wants to optimize the over-
all effect of the advertising campaign. While the
effect of an ad campaign in any medium is a com-
plicated phenomenon to quantify, one commonly ac-
cepted (and easily quantified) notion in search-based
advertising on the Internet is to maximize the number
of clicks. The Internet search companies are support-
ive towards advertisers and provide statistics about
1The choice of keywords is related to the domain-knowledge
of the advertiser, user behavior and strategic considerations.
Internet search companies provide the advertisers with sum-
maries of the query traffic which is useful for them to optimize
their keyword choices interactively. We do not directly ad-
dress the choice of keywords in this paper, which is addressed
elsewhere [11].
1
the history of click volumes and prediction about the
future performance of various keywords. Still, this is
a complex problem for the following reasons (among
others):
• Individual keywords have significantly different
characteristics from each other; e.g., while “fish-
ing” is a broad keyword that matches many
user queries and has many competing advertis-
ers, “humane fishing bait” is a niche keyword
that matches only a few queries, but might have
less competition.
• There are complex interactions between key-
words because a user query may match two or
more keywords. This is quite common since the
advertiser is trying to cover all the possible key-
words in some domain. In effect the advertiser
ends up competing with themselves.
As a result, the advertisers face a challenging opti-
mization problem. The focus of this paper is to solve
this optimization problem.
1.1 The Budget Optimization Problem. We
present a short discussion and formulation of the op-
timization problem faced by advertisers; a more de-
tailed description is in Section 2.
A given advertiser sees the state of the auctions for
search-based advertising as follows. There is a set K
of keywords of interest; in practice, even small adver-
tisers typically have a large set K. There is a set Q
of queries posed by the users. For each query q ∈ Q,
there are functions giving the clicksq(b) and costq(b)
that result from bidding a particular amount b in the
auction for that query, which we model more formally
in the next section. There is a bipartite graph G
on the two vertex sets representing K and Q respec-
tively. For any query q ∈ Q, the neighbors of q in K
are the keywords that are said to “match” the query
q.2 The budget optimization problem is as follows.
Given graph G together with the functions clicksq(·)
and costq(·) on the queries, as well as a budget U ,
determine the assignment of bids bk to each keyword
k ∈ K such that
∑
q clicksq(bq) is maximized subject
to
∑
q costq(bq) ≤ U , where the “effective bid” bq on
a query is some function of the keyword bids in the
neighborhood of q.
While we can cast this problem as a traditional
optimization problem, there are different challenges
2The particulars of the matching rule are determined by
the Internet search company; here we treat the function as
arbitrary.
in practice depending on the advertiser’s access to
the query and graph information, and indeed the re-
liability of this information (e.g., it could be based
on unstable historical data). Thus it is important to
find solutions to this problem that not only get many
clicks, but are also simple, robust and less reliant on
the information. In this paper we define the notion of
a “uniform” strategy which is essentially a strategy
that bids uniformly on all keywords. Since this type
of strategy obviates the need to know anything about
the particulars of the graph, and effectively aggre-
gates the click and cost functions on the queries, it is
quite robust, and thus desirable in practice. What is
surprising is that uniform strategy actually performs
well, which we will prove.
1.2 Our Main Results and Technical
Overview. We present positive and negative
results for the budget optimization problem. In
particular, we show:
• Nearly all formulations of the problem are NP-
Hard. In cases slightly more general than the
formulation above, where the clicks have weights,
the problem is inapproximable better than a fac-
tor of 1− 1e .
• We give a (1−1/e)-approximation algorithm for
the budget optimization problem. The strat-
egy found by the algorithm is a two-bid uniform
strategy, which means that it randomizes be-
tween bidding some value b1 on all keywords, and
bidding some other value b2 on all keywords.
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We show that this approximation ratio is tight
for uniform strategies.
We also give a (1/2)-approximation algorithm
that offers a single-bid uniform strategy, only us-
ing one value b1. (This is tight for single-bid
strategies.) These strategies can be computed in
time nearly linear in |Q|+ |K|, the input size.
Uniform strategies may appear to be naive in first
consideration because the keywords vary significantly
in their click and cost functions, and there may
be complex interaction between them when multiple
keywords are relevant to a query. After all, the op-
timum can configure arbitrary bids on each of the
keywords. Even for the simple case when the graph
is a matching, the optimal algorithm involves plac-
ing different bids on different keywords as given by
3This type of strategy can also be interpreted as bidding
one value (on all keywords) for part of the day, and a different
value for the rest of the day.
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a walk on the “convex hulls” of the functions associ-
ated with the keywords (Section B). So, it might be
surprising that a simple two-bid uniform strategy is
63% or more effective compared to the optimum. In
fact, our proof is stronger, showing that this strat-
egy is 63% effective against a strictly more powerful
adversary who can bid independently on the individ-
ual queries, i.e., not be constrained by the interaction
provided by the graph G.
As in nearly all the proofs that generate a 1− 1/e
approximation ratio, an adversarial analysis and a
distribution over strategies play a key role, and we
discovered the optimal distributions using a factor-
revealing LP as described in Section 4.
Without overemphasizing, it should be clear that
advertisers might have a preference for uniform bid-
ding strategies. Our preliminary experimental results
using real auction data logs at Google indicate that
these simple bidding strategies are significantly bet-
ter than the theoretical guarantees, but the focus here
remains proving theoretical bounds.
The formulation of the problem above and its jus-
tification is presented in Section 2 with a detailed
modeling of the auction process in Internet search
companies. We then define precisely the notion of a
uniform strategy (Section 3), and present our approx-
imation algorithm (Section 4). We conclude with a
discussion of extensions and open problems. In the
appendix we present hardness results for the budget
optimization problem and its variants, and give exact
algorithms for some special cases.
2 Modeling a Keyword Auction
We describe an auction from an advertiser’s point of
view. An advertiser bids on a keyword, which we
can think of as a word or set of words. Users of the
search engine submit queries. If the query “matches”
a keyword that has been bid on by an advertiser, then
the advertiser is entered into an auction for the avail-
able ad slots on the results page. What constitutes a
“match” varies depending on the search engine.
Note that an advertiser makes a single bid for a
keyword that remains in effect for a period of time,
say one day, and the keyword could match many dif-
ferent user queries throughout the day. Each user
query might have a different set of advertisers com-
peting for clicks. The advertiser could also bid differ-
ent amounts on multiple keywords, each matching a
(possibly overlapping) set of user queries.
The ultimate goal of an advertiser is to maximize
traffic to their website, given a certain advertising
budget. We now formalize a model of keyword bid-
ding and define an optimization problem that cap-
tures this goal.
2.1 Landscapes. We begin by considering the
case of a single keyword that matches a single user
query. In this section we define the notion of a “query
landscape” that describes the relationship between
the advertiser’s bid and what will happen on this
query as a result of this bid.[8] This definition will
be central to the discussion as we continue to more
general cases.
2.1.1 Positions, bids and click-through rate.
The search results page for a query contains p possible
positions in which our ad can appear. We denote the
highest (most favorable) position by 1 and lowest by
p.
Associated with each position i is a value α[i] that
denotes the click-through rate (ctr) of the ad in posi-
tion i. The ctr is a measure of how likely it is that our
ad will receive a click if placed in position i. The ctr
can be measured empirically using past history. We
assume throughout this work that that α[i] ≤ α[j]
if j < i, that is, higher positions receive at least as
many clicks as lower positions.
In order to place an ad on this page, we must enter
the auction that is carried out among all advertisers
that have submitted a bid on a keyword that matches
the user’s query. We will refer to such an auction as
a query auction, to emphasize that there is an auc-
tion for each query rather than for each keyword. We
assume that the auction is a generalized second price
(GSP) auction [4, 6]: the advertisers are ranked in de-
creasing order of bid, and each advertiser is assigned
a price equal to the amount bid by the advertiser be-
low them in the ranking.4 Note that in sponsored
search auctions, this advertiser pays only if the user
actually clicks on the ad. Let (b[1], . . . ,b[p]) denote
the bids of the top p advertisers in this query auction.
For notational convenience, we assume that b[0] =∞
and b[p] = α[p] = 0. Since the auction is a gener-
alized second price auction, higher bids win higher
positions; i.e. b[i] ≥ b[i+ 1]. Suppose that we bid b
on some keyword that matches the user’s query, then
4Google, Yahoo! and MSN all use some variant of the GSP
auction. Also, other auctions besides GSP have been consid-
ered; e.g., the Vickrey Clark Groves (VCG) auction [12, 3, 6].
Each auction mechanism will result in a different sort of op-
timization problem. In the conclusion we point out that for
the VCG auction, the bidding optimization problem becomes
quite easy.
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our position is defined by the largest b[i] that is at
most b, that is,
pos(b) = argmax
i
(b[i] : b[i] ≤ b). (1)
Since we only pay if the user clicks (and that happens
with probability α[i]), our expected cost for winning
position i would be cost[i] = α[i] · b[i], where i =
pos(b). We use costq(b) and clicksq(b) to denote the
expected cost and clicks that result from having a bid
b that qualifies for a query auction q, and thus
costq(b) = α[i] · b[i] where i = pos(b), (2)
clicksq(b) = α[i] where i = pos(b). (3)
The following observations about cost and clicks
follow immediately from the definitions and equa-
tions (1), (2) and (3).
Observation 1 For b ∈ R+,
1. (costq(b), clicksq(b)) can only take on
one of a finite set of values Vq =
{(cost[1], α[1]), . . . , (cost[p], α[p])}.
2. Both costq(b) and clicksq(b) are non-decreasing
functions of b. Also, cost-per-click (cpc)
costq(b)/clicksq(b) is non-decreasing in b.
3. costq(b)/clicksq(b) ≤ b.
For bids (b[1], . . . ,b[p]) that correspond to the bids
of other advertisers, we have: costq(b[i])/clicksq(b[i])
= b[i], i ∈ [p]. When the context is clear, we drop the
subscript q.
2.1.2 Landscapes. We can summarize the data
contained in the functions cost(b) and clicks(b) as a
collection of points in a plot of cost vs. clicks, which
we refer to as a landscape. For example, for a query
with four slots, a landscape might look like Table 1.
bid range cost per click cost clicks
[$2.60,∞) $2.60 $1.30 .5
[$2.00,$2.60) $2.00 $0.90 .45
[$1.60,$2.00) $1.60 $0.40 .25
[$0.50,$1.60) $0.50 $0.10 .2
[$0,$0.50) $0 $0 0
Table 1: A landscape for a query
It is convenient to represent this data graphically as
in Figure 1. Here we graph clicks as a function of cost.
Observe that in this graph, the cpc (cost(b)/clicks(b))
of each point is the reciprocal of the slope of the line
from the origin to the point. Since cost(b), clicks(b)
and cost(b)/clicks(b) are non-decreasing, the slope of
the line from the origin to successive points on the
plot decreases. This condition is slightly weaker than
concavity.
.5
.4
.3
.2
.1
$0.20 $0.40 $0.60 $0.80 $1.00 $1.20
Cost
Clicks
Figure 1: A bid landscape. We graph clicks as a
function of cost.
Suppose we would like to solve budget optimiza-
tion problem for a single keyword landscape.5 As
we increase our bid from zero, our cost increases and
our expected number of clicks increases, and so we
simply submit the highest bid such that we remain
within our budget.
One problem we see right away is that since there
are only a finite set of points in this landscape, we
may not be able to target arbitrary budgets effi-
ciently. Suppose in the example from Table 1 that
we had a budget of $1.00. Bidding between $2.00
and $2.60 uses only $0.90, and so we are underspend-
ing. Bidding more than $2.60 is not an option, since
we would then incur a cost of $1.30 and overspend
our budget.
2.2 Randomized strategies. To rectify this
problem and better utilize our available budget,
we allow randomized bidding strategies. Let B
be a distribution on bids b ∈ R+.6 Now we
define cost(B) = Eb∼B[cost(b)] and clicks(B) =
Eb∼B[clicks(b)]. Graphically, the possible values of
5Of course it is a bit unrealistic to imagine that an adver-
tiser would have to worry about a budget if only one user query
was being considered; however one could imagine multiple in-
stances of the same query and the problem scales.
6 We use R+ to denote the nonnegative reals.
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(cost(B), clicks(B)) lie in the convex hull of the land-
scape points. See Figure 2 for the set of allowable
bids for the example in Table 1.
$0.20 $0.40 $0.60 $0.80 $1.00 $1.20
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Cost
Clicks
Figure 2: The convex hull of allowable randomized
bids.
To find a bid distribution B that maximizes clicks
subject to a budget, we simply draw a vertical line
on the plot where the cost is equal to the budget, and
find the highest point on this line in the convex hull.
This point will always be the convex combination of
at most two original landscape points which them-
selves lie on the convex hull. Thus, given the point on
the convex hull, it is easy to compute a distribution
on two bids which led to this point. Summarizing,
Lemma 1 If an advertiser is bidding on one key-
word, subject to a budget U , then the optimal strategy
is to pick a convex combination of (at most) two bids
which are at the endpoints of the line on the convex
hull at the highest point for cost U .
There is one subtlety in this formulation. Given
any bidding strategy, randomized or otherwise, the
resulting cost is itself a random variable represent-
ing the expected cost. Thus if our budget constraint
is a hard budget, we have to deal with the difficul-
ties that arise if our strategy would be over budget.
Therefore, we think of our budget constraint as soft,
that is, we only require that our expected cost be less
than the budget. In practice, the budget is often an
average daily budget, and thus we don’t worry if we
exceed it one day, as long as we are meeting the bud-
get in expectation. Further, either the advertiser or
the search engine (possibly both), monitor the cost
incurred over the day; hence, the advertiser’s bid can
be changed to zero for part of the day, so that the
budget is not overspent.7 Thus in the remainder of
this paper, we will formulate a budget constraint that
only needs to be respected in expectation.
2.3 Keyword Interaction. In reality, search ad-
vertisers can bid on a large set of keywords, each of
them qualifying for a different (possibly overlapping)
set of queries.
One complicating factor is that most search engines
do not allow an advertiser to appear twice in the same
search results page. 8 Thus, if an advertiser has a bid
on two different keywords that match the same query,
this conflict must be resolved somehow. For example,
if an advertiser has a bid out on the keywords “shoes”
and “high-heel,” then if a user issues the query “high-
heel shoes,” it will match on two different keywords.
The search engine specifies, in advance, a rule for
resolution based on the query the keyword and the
bid. The most natural rule is to take the keyword
with the highest bid, which we adopt here, but our
results apply to other natural resolution rules.
We model this problem using an undirected bipar-
tite graph G = (K ∪ Q,E) where K is a set of key-
words and Q is a set of queries. Each q ∈ Q has
an associated landscape, as defined by costq(b) and
clicksq(b). An edge (k, q) ∈ E means that keyword k
matches query q.
The advertiser can control their individual keyword
bid vector a ∈ R
|K|
+ specifying a bid ak for each key-
word k ∈ K. (For now, we do not consider random-
ized bids, but we will introduce that shortly.) Given
a particular bid vector a on the keywords, we use the
resolution rule of taking the maximum to define the
“effective bid” on query q as
bq(a) = max
k:(k,q)∈E
ak.
By submitting a bid vector a, the advertiser receives
some number of clicks and pays some cost on each
keyword. We use the term spend to denote the to-
tal cost, i.e. the amount spent. Similarly, we use
the term traffic to denote the total number of clicks.
These are defined by the following formulae.
spend(a) =
∑
q∈Q
costq(bq(a))
traffic(a) =
∑
q∈Q
clicksq(bq(a))
7See https://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=22183 ,
for example.
8See https://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=14179 ,
for example.
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We also allow randomized strategies, where an adver-
tiser gives a distribution A over bid vectors a ∈ R
|K|
+ .
The resulting spend and traffic are given by
spend(A) = Ea∼A[spend(a)],
traffic(A) = Ea∼A[traffic(a)].
We can now state the Budget Optimization
problem in its full generality:
Budget Optimization
Input: a budget U , a keyword-query graph G =
(K∪Q,E), and landscapes (costq(·), clicksq(·)) for
each q ∈ Q.
Find: a distribution A over bid vectors a ∈ R
|K|
+
such that spend(A) ≤ U and traffic(A) is maxi-
mized.
We conclude this section with a small example to
illustrate the complications in this problem. Suppose
you have two keywords K = {u, v} and two queries
Q = {x, y} and edges E = {(u, x), (u, y), (v, y)}. Sup-
pose query x has one position with ctr αx[1] = 1.0,
and there is one bid bx1 = $1. Query y has two posi-
tions with ctrs αy [1] = αy [2] = 1.0, and bids by1 = $ǫ
and by2 = $1 To get any clicks from x, an advertiser
must bid at least $1 on u. However, because of the
structure of the graph, if the advertiser sets bu to $1,
then his effective bid is $1 on both x and y. Thus he
must tradeoff between getting the clicks from x and
getting the bargain of a click for $ǫ that would be
possible otherwise.
3 Uniform Bidding Strategies
As we will show in Section C, solving the Budget
Optimization problem in its full generality is diffi-
cult. In addition, it may be difficult to reason strate-
gies that involve arbitrary distributions over arbitrary
bid vectors. Advertisers generally prefer strategies
that are easy to understand, evaluate and use within
their larger goals. With this motivation, we look at
restricted classes of strategies that we can easily com-
pute, explain and analyze.
We define a uniform bidding strategy to be a dis-
tribution A over bid vectors a ∈ R
|K|
+ where each bid
vector in the distribution is of the form (b, b, . . . , b)
for some real-valued bid b. In other words, each vec-
tor in the distribution bids the same value on every
keyword.
Uniform strategies have several advantages. First,
they do not depend on the edges of the interac-
tion graph, since all effective bids on queries are the
same. Thus, they are effective in the face of limited
or noisy information about the keyword interaction
graph. Second, uniform strategies are also indepen-
dent of the priority rule being used. Third, any al-
gorithm that gives an approximation guarantee will
then be valid for any interaction graph over those
keywords and queries.
We now show that we can compute the best uni-
form strategy efficiently.
Suppose we have a set of queries Q, where the
landscape Vq for each query q is defined by the set
of points Vq = {(costq[1], αq[1]), . . . , (costq[p], αq[p])}.
We define the set of interesting bids Iq =
{costq[1]/αq[1], . . . , costq[p]/αq[p]}, let I = ∪q∈QIq,
and let N = |I|. We can index the points in I as
b1, . . . , bN in increasing order. The ith point in our
aggregate landscape V is found by summing, over the
queries, the cost and clicks associated with bid bi,
that is, V = ∪Ni=1(
∑
q∈Q costq(bi),
∑
q∈Q clicksq(bi)).
For any possible bid b, if we use the aggregate land-
scape just as we would a regular landscape, we ex-
actly represent the cost and clicks associated with
making that bid simultaneously on all queries associ-
ated with the aggregate landscape. Therefore, all the
definitions and results of Section 2 about landscapes
can be extended to aggregate landscapes, and we can
apply Lemma 1 to compute the best uniform strat-
egy (using the convex hull of the points in this ag-
gregate landscape). The running time is dominated
by the time to compute the convex hull, which is
O(N logN)[10].
Note also that the strategy we get is the convex
combination of two points on the aggregate land-
scape. Define a two-bid strategy to be a uniform strat-
egy which puts non-zero weight on at most two bid
vectors. We have shown
Lemma 2 Given an instance of the Budget Op-
timization problem in which there are a total of N
points in all the landscapes, we can find the best uni-
form strategy in O(N logN) time. Furthermore, this
strategy will always be a two-bid strategy.
Putting these ideas together, we get the following
O(N logN)-time algorithm for the Budget Opti-
mization problem, where N is the total number of
landscape points. (We later show that this is a (1− 1e )-
approximation algorithm.)
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1. Aggregate all the points from the individual query
landscapes into a single aggregate landscape.
2. Find the convex hull of the points in the aggregate
landscape.
3. Compute the point on the convex hull for the given
budget, which is the convex combination of two
points α and β.
4. Output the strategy which is the appropriate con-
vex combination of the uniform bid vectors corre-
sponding to α and β.
We will also consider a special case of two-bid
strategies. A single-bid strategy is a uniform strategy
which puts non-zero weight on at most one non-zero
vector, i.e. advertiser randomizes between bidding a
certain amount b∗ on all keywords, and not bidding at
all. A single-bid strategy is even easier to implement
in practice than a two-bid strategy. For example, the
search engines often allow advertisers to set a maxi-
mum daily budget. In this case, the advertiser would
simply bid b∗ until her budget runs out, and the ad
serving system would remove her from all subsequent
auctions until the end of the day. One could also use
an “ad scheduling” tool offered by some search com-
panies9 to implement this strategy. The best single-
bid strategy can also be computed easily from the ag-
gregate landscape. The optimal strategy for a budget
U will either be the point x s.t. cost(x) is as large as
possible without exceeding U , or a convex combina-
tion of zero and the point y, where cost(y) is as small
as possible while larger than U .
4 Approximation Algorithms
In the previous section we proposed using uniform
strategies and gave an efficient algorithm to compute
the best such strategy. In section we prove that there
is always a good uniform strategy:
Theorem 3 There always exists a uniform bidding
strategy that is (1− 1e )-optimal. Furthermore, for any
ǫ > 0, there exists an instance for which all uniform
strategies are at most (1− 1e + ǫ)-optimal.
We introduce the notion of a click-price curve,
which is central to our analysis. This definition makes
it simple to show that there is always a single-bid
strategy that is a 12 -approximation (and this is tight);
we then build on this to prove Theorem 3.
9See https://adwords.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=33227 ,
for example.
Query clicks cost cpc
A 2 $1 $0.50
B 5 $0.50 $0.10
C 3 $2 $0.67
D 4 $1 $0.25
Table 2: A set of four queries and their optimal clicks
and cost
$0.10
$0.50
$0.70
$0.30
B
D
A
C
9 145 11
Clicks
cpc
Figure 3: A click-price curve for the queries in Ta-
ble 2.
4.1 Click-price curves. Consider a set of queries
Q, and for each query q ∈ Q, let (clicksq(·), costq(·))
be the corresponding bid landscape. Consider an ad-
versarial bidder Ω with the power to bid indepen-
dently on each query. Note that this bidder is a more
powerful than an optimal bidder, which has to bid on
the keywords. Suppose this strategy bids b∗q for each
query q. Thus, Ω achieves traffic CΩ =
∑
i clicks(b
∗
i ),
and incurs total spend UΩ =
∑
i cost(b
∗
i ).
Note that without loss of generality we can assume
that Ω bids so that for each query q, the cost per
click is equal to b∗q , i.e. costq(b
∗
q)/clicksq(b
∗
q) = b
∗
q .
We may assume this because for some query q, if
costq(b
∗
q)/clicksq(b
∗
q) < b
∗
q , we can always lower b
∗
q
and keep the same cost and clicks.
To aid our discussion, we introduce the notion of
a click-price curve, an example of which is shown in
Figure 3. Formally the curve is a non-decreasing func-
tion h : [0, CΩ] 7→ R+. defined as
h(r) = min{c |
∑
q:b∗q≤c
clicksq ≥ r}
Another way to construct this curve is to
sort the queries in increasing order by b∗q =
costq(b
∗
q)/clicksq(b
∗
q), then make a step function
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where the qth step has height b∗q and width clicksq(b
∗
q)
(see Figure 3). Note that the area of each step is
costq(b
∗
q). The following claim follows immediately:
Claim 1 UΩ =
∫ CΩ
0 h(r)dr.
Suppose we wanted to buy some fraction r′/CΩ of
the traffic that Ω is getting. The click-price curve says
that if we bid h(r′) on every keyword (and therefore
every query), we get at least r′ traffic, since this bid
would ensure that for all q such that b∗q ≤ h(r
′) we win
as many clicks as Ω. Note that by bidding h(r′) on
every keyword, we may actually get even more than
r′ traffic, since for queries q where b∗q is much less
than h(r′) we may win more clicks than Ω. However,
all of these extra clicks still cost at most h(r′) per
click.
Thus we see that for any r′ ∈ [0, CΩ], if we bid h(r′)
on every keyword, we receive at least r′ traffic at a
total spend of at most h(r′) per click. Note that by
randomizing between bidding zero and bidding h(r′),
we can receive exactly r′ traffic at a total spend of at
most r′ · h(r′). We summarize this discussion in the
following lemma:
Lemma 4 For any r ∈ [0, CΩ], there exists a single-
bid strategy that randomizes between bidding h(r) and
bidding zero, and this strategy receives exactly r traffic
with total spend at most r · h(r).
Finally, we show that the strategies described in
Lemma 4 are essentially the only ones available for
the distribution in a uniform strategy, at least for a
certain class of instances (the proof can be found in
the appendix):
Lemma 5 For any C,U > 0 and non-decreasing
function f : [0, C] → R+ such that
∫ C
0 f(r)dr = U ,
and any small ǫ′ > 0, there exists an instance of
Budget Optimization with budget U + ǫ′, where
the optimal solution achieves C clicks at cost U + ǫ′,
and all uniform bidding strategies are convex com-
binations of single-bid strategies that achieve exactly
r clicks at cost exactly rf(r) by bidding f(r) on all
keywords.
4.2 A 12 -approximation algorithm. Using
Lemma 4 we can now show that there is a uniform
single-bid strategy that is 12 -optimal. In addition to
being an interesting result in its own right, it also
serves as a warm-up for our main result.
Theorem 6 There always exists a uniform single-
bid strategy that is 12 -optimal. Furthermore, for any
ǫ > 0 there exists an instance for which all single-bid
strategies are at most (12 + ǫ)-optimal.
Proof: Applying Lemma 4 with r = CΩ/2, we see
that there is a strategy that achieves traffic CΩ/2 with
spend CΩ/2 ·h(CΩ/2). Now, using the fact that h is a
non-decreasing function combined with Claim 1, we
have
(CΩ/2)h(CΩ/2) ≤
∫ CΩ
CΩ/2
h(r)dr ≤
∫ CΩ
0
h(r)dr = UΩ,
(4)
which shows that we spend at most UΩ. We conclude
that there is a 12 -optimal single-bid strategy random-
izing between bidding CΩ/2 and zero.
The second part of the Theorem appears in the
Appendix.
4.3 A (1 − 1e )-approximation algorithm. We
now prove Theorem 3. The key to the proof is to show
that there is a distribution over single-bid strategies
from Lemma 4 that obtains at least (1− 1e )CΩ clicks.
In order to figure out the best distribution, we wrote a
linear program that models the behavior of a player
who is trying to maximize clicks and an adversary
who is trying to create an input that is hard for the
player. Then using linear programming duality, we
were able to derive both an optimal strategy and a
tight instance. After solving the LP numerically, we
were also able to see that there is a uniform strategy
for the player that always obtains (1 − 1e )CΩ clicks;
and then from the solution were easily able to “guess”
the optimal distribution. This methodology is similar
to that used in work on factor-revealing LPs [7, 9].
4.3.1 An LP for finding the worst-case click-
price curve. Consider the adversary’s problem of
finding a click-price curve for which no uniform bid-
ding strategy can achieve αCΩ clicks. Recall that
by Lemma 1 we can assume that a uniform strat-
egy randomizes between two bids u and v. We also
assume that the uniform strategy uses a convex com-
bination of strategies from Lemma 4, which we can
assume by Lemma 5. Thus, to achieve αCΩ clicks, a
uniform strategy must randomize between bids h(u)
and h(v) where u ≤ αCΩ and v ≥ αCΩ. Call the set
of such strategies S. Given a (u, v) ∈ S, the necessary
probabilities in order to achieve αCΩ clicks are eas-
ily determined, and we denote them by p1(u, v) and
p2(u, v) respectively. Note further that the advertiser
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is trying to figure out which of these strategies to use,
and ultimately wants to compute a distribution over
uniform strategies. In the LP, she is actually going
to compute a distribution over pairs of strategies in
S, which we will then interpret as a distribution over
strategies.
Using this set of uniform strategies as constraints,
we can characterize a set of worst-case click-price
curves by the constraints
∫ CΩ
0
h(r)dr ≤ U
∀(u, v) ∈ S p1(u, v)uh(u) + p2(u, v)vh(v) ≥ U
A curve h that satisfies these constraints has the
property that all uniform strategies that obtain αCΩ
clicks spend more than U . Discretizing this set of
inequalities, and pushing the first constraint into the
objective function, we get the following LP over vari-
ables hr representing the curve:
min
∑
r∈{0,ǫ,2ǫ,...,CΩ}
ǫ · hr s.t.
∀(u, v) ∈ S, p1(u, v)uhu + p2(u, v)vhv ≥ U
In this LP, S is defined in the discrete domain as
S = {(u, v) ∈ {0, ǫ, 2ǫ, . . . , CΩ}2 : 0 ≤ u ≤ αCΩ ≤
v ≤ CΩ}.
Solving this LP for a particular α, if we get an ob-
jective less than U , we know (up to some discretiza-
tion) that an instance of Budget Optimization ex-
ists that cannot be approximated better than α. (The
instance is constructed as in the proof of Lemma 5.)
A binary search yields the lowest such α where the
objective is exactly U .
To obtain a strategy for the advertiser, we look at
the dual, constraining the objective to be equal to U
in order to get the polytope of optimum solutions:∑
(u,v)∈S
wu,v = 1
∀(u, v) ∈ S,
∑
v′:(u,v′)∈S
p1(u, v
′)uwu,v′ ≤ ǫ and
∑
u′:(u′,v)∈S
p2(u
′, v)vwu′,v ≤ ǫ.
It is straightforward to show that the second set of
constraints is equivalent to the following:
∀h ∈ RCΩ/ǫ :
∑
r
ǫhr = U,
∑
(u,v)∈S
wu,v(p1(u, v)uhu + p2(u, v)vhv) ≤ U.
Here the variables can be interpreted as weights on
strategies in S. A point in this polytope represents
a convex combination over strategies in S, with the
property that for any click-price curve h, the cost of
the mixed strategy is at most U . Since all strate-
gies in S get at least αCΩ clicks, we have a strat-
egy that achieves an α-approximation. Interestingly,
the equivalence between this polytope and the LP
dual above shows that there is a mixture over values
r ∈ [0, C] that achieves an α-approximation for any
curve h.
After a search for the appropriate α (which turned
out to be 1− 1e ), we solved these two LPs and came
up with the plots in Figure 4 (see appendix), which
reveal not only the right approximation ratio, but
also a picture of the worst-case distribution and the
approximation-achieving strategy.10 From the pic-
tures, we were able to quickly “guess” the optimal
strategy and worst case example.
4.3.2 Proof of Theorem 3. We can now com-
plete the proof of Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3: By Lemma 4, we know that for
each r ≤ UΩ, there is a strategy that can obtain traffic
r at cost r · h(r). By mixing strategies for multiple
values of r, we construct a uniform strategy that is
guaranteed to achieve at least 1−e−1 = 0.63 fraction
of Ω’s traffic and remain within budget. Note that
the “final” resulting bid distribution will have some
weight on the zero bid, since the single-bid strategies
from Lemma 4 put some weight on bidding zero.
Consider the following probability density function
over such strategies (also depicted in Figure 4):
g(r) =
{
0 for r < CΩ/e
1/r for r ≥ CΩ/e
Note that
∫ CΩ
0
g(r) dr =
∫ CΩ
CΩ/e
1
r dr = 1, i.e. g is a
probability density function. The traffic achieved by
our strategy is equal to
traffic =
∫ CΩ
0
g(r)·r dr =
∫ CΩ
CΩ/e
1
r
·r dr =
(
1−
1
e
)
CΩ.
The expected total spend of this strategy is at most
spend =
∫ CΩ
0
g(r) · rh(r) dr
=
∫ CΩ
CΩ/e
h(r) dr ≤
∫ CΩ
0
h(r) dr = UΩ.
10The parameters U and CΩ can be set arbitrarily using
scaling arguments.
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Thus we have shown that there exists a uniform bid-
ding strategy that is (1− 1e )-optimal.
We now show that no uniform strategy can do bet-
ter. We will prove that for all ǫ > 0 there exists an
instance for which all uniform strategies are at most
(1− 1e + ǫ)-optimal.
First we define the following click-price curve over
the domain [0, 1]:
h(r) =


0 for r < e−1
1
e− 2
(
e−
1
r
)
for r ≥ e−1
Note that h is non-decreasing and non-negative.
Since the curve is over the domain [0, 1] it corre-
sponds to an instance where CΩ = 1. Note also
that
∫ 1
0 h(r) dr =
1
e−2
∫ 1
1/e e −
1
r dr = 1. Thus, this
curve corresponds to an instance where UΩ = 1. Us-
ing Lemma 5, we construct such an instance where
the best uniform strategies are convex combinations
of strategies that bid h(u) and achieve u clicks and
u · h(u) cost.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there
exists a uniform bidding strategy that achieves α >
1 − e−1 traffic on this instance. By Lemma 1 there
is always a two-bid optimal uniform bidding strategy
and so we may assume that the strategy achieving α
clicks randomizes over two bids. To achieve α clicks,
the two bids must be on values h(u) and h(v) with
probabilities pu and pv such that pu + pv = 1, 0 ≤
u ≤ α ≤ v and puu+ pvv = α.
To calculate the spend of this strategy consider two
cases: if u = 0 then we are bidding h(v) with proba-
bility pv = α/v. The spend in this case is:
spend = pv · vh(v) = αh(v) =
αe− α/v
e− 2
Using v ≥ α and then α > 1− 1e we get
spend ≥
αe− 1
e− 2
>
(1− 1/e)e− 1
e− 2
= 1,
contradicting the assumption.
We turn to the case u > 0. Here we have pu =
v−α
v−u
and pv =
α−u
v−u . Note that for r ∈ (0, 1] we have
h(r) ≥ 1e−2 (e−
1
r ). Thus
spend ≥ pu · uh(u) + pv · vh(v)
=
(v − α)(ue− 1) + (α − u)(ve− 1)
(v − u)(e− 2)
=
αe− 1
e− 2
> 1
The final inequality follows from α > 1 − 1e . Thus
in both cases the spend of our strategy is over the
budget of 1.
5 Extensions and Concluding Re-
marks
The Budget Optimization problem can be solved
exactly for several special cases, first when the graph
is a matching, then when we know an ordering on the
keyword bids and finally on a more general scenario
in which the keywords define a laminar family of sets
over the queries. These results appear in Appendix B.
In its generality, the Budget Optimization prob-
lem is hard. It is trivially weakly NP-hard because it
encodes the Knapsack problem. We show further that
the Budget Optimization problem is strongly NP-
hard, and a weighted generalization of the Budget
Optimization problem is hard to approximate to
within (1−1/e). These results appear in Appendix C.
We have done some preliminary experiments using
real auction data logs at Google. The uniform bid-
ding strategies seem to be significantly better than
the theoretical guarantees of 0.5 and 0.63. We plan
to do more detailed experimental study and also un-
derstand the properties of real inputs.
Our algorithmic result presents an intriguing
heuristic in practice. Say an advertiser chooses some
bid value b and bids that on all keywords. At the end
of the day, if the budget is underspent, they adjust
b to be higher; if budget is overspent, they adjust b
to be lower; else, they maintain b. If the scenario
does not change from day to day, this simple strat-
egy will have the same theoretical properties as our
one-bid strategy, and in practice, likely to be much
better. Our belief is that this heuristic may even-
tually become one of choice for advertisers since it
does not involve detailed consideration of landscapes
and interactions. We intend to evaluate this scheme
experimentally.
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Figure 4: The worst-case click-price curve and (1 −
1/e)-approximate uniform bidding strategy, as found
by linear programming.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5: Construct an instance as follows.
Let ǫ > 0 be a small number that we will later de-
fine in terms of ǫ′. Define r0 = 0, r1, r2, . . . , rm = C
such that ri−1 < ri ≤ ri−1 + ǫ, f(ri−1) ≤ f(ri) ≤
f(ri−1) + ǫ, and m ≤ (C + f(C))/ǫ. (This is possi-
ble by choosing ri’s spaced by min(ǫ, f(ri)−f(ri−1)))
Now make a query qi for all i ∈ [m] with bidders bid-
ding h(ri), h(ri+1), . . . , h(rm), and ctr’s α[1] = α[2] =
· · · = α[m−i+1] = ri−ri−1. The graph is a matching
with one keyword per query, and so we can imagine
the optimal solution as bidding on queries. The op-
timal solution will always bid exactly h(ri) on query
qi, and if it did so on all queries, it would spend
U ′ :=
∑m
i=1(ri− ri−1)h(ri). Define ǫ small enough so
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that U ′ = U + ǫ′, which is always possible since
U ′ ≤
∫ C
0
f(r)dr +
m∑
i=1
(ri − ri−1)(h(ri)− h(ri−1))
≤ U + ǫ2m ≤ U + ǫ(C + f(C)).
Note that the only possible bids (i.e., all others have
the same results as one of these) are f(r0), . . . , f(rm),
and bidding uniformly with f(ri) results in
∑i
j=1 ri−
ri−1 = ri clicks at cost h(ri)ri.
Proof of Theorem 6: Here we complete the proof of
Theorem 6. For the second part of the theorem, to
construct a tight example, we use two queries Q =
{x, y}, two keywords K = {u, v}, and edges E =
{(u, x), (v, y)}.
Fix some α where 0 < α ≤ 1, and fix some very
small ǫ > 0. Query x has two positions, with bids of
bx1 = 1/α and b
x
2 = ǫ, and with identical click-through
rates αx[1] = αx[2] = α. Query y has one position,
with a bid of by1 = 1/α and a click-through rate of
αy[1] = α. The budget is U = 1 + ǫα. The optimal
solution is to bid ǫ on u (and therefore x) and bid 1/α
on v (and therefore y), both with probability 1. This
achieves a total of 2α clicks and spends the budget
exactly. The only useful bids are 0, ǫ and 1/α, since
for both queries all other bids are identical in terms of
cost and clicks to one of those three. Any single-bid
solution that uses ǫ as its non-zero bid gets at most
α clicks. Bidding 1/α on both keywords results in
2α clicks and total cost 2. Thus, since the budget is
U = 1 + ǫα < 2, a single-bid solution using 1/α can
put weight at most (1 + ǫα)/2 on the 1/α bid. This
results in at most α(1+ ǫα) clicks. This can be made
arbitrarily close to α by lowering ǫ.
B Beyond Uniform Strategies: opti-
mal strategies for some graphs
In this section we solve the Budget Optimization
problem exactly for several special cases, first when
the graph is a matching, then when we know an or-
dering on the keyword bids and finally on a more
general scenario in which the keywords define a lami-
nar family of sets over the queries. We will also show
how the matching defines an upper bound, useful in
later sections.
B.1 A matching. We consider a graph G which is
a matching, that is, each node has degree at most 1.
In this case, the advertiser can bid on each query in-
dependently (via the unique matched keyword), and
the interaction among keywords is not an issue. The
resulting optimization problem is a small generaliza-
tion of the fractional knapsack problem in which each
item has a size and value and we wish to select a set
of items such that the total size is at most the knap-
sack size while maximizing the total value. We now
sketch an algorithm, due to Labio et al. [8].
The first step of the algorithm is to take the con-
vex hull of each query landscape, as in Figure 2,
and remove any landscape points not on the con-
vex hull. (See the discussion around Lemma 1 for
justification.) Then, for each query we have a piece-
wise linear concave curve. Examining each “piece” of
these curves more carefully, we see that a particular
piece represents the incremental number of clicks and
cost incurred by moving one’s bid on a keyword (and
therefore its matching query) from one particular bid
to another. More precisely, for the piece connecting
two consecutive bids b′ and b′′ on the convex hull,
we create an entry with cost cost(b′′) − cost(b′) and
clicks clicks(b′′) − clicks(b′). These values represent
the incremental cost and clicks associated with mov-
ing from bid b′ to bid b′′. For example, in Figure 2,
the piece between the second and third point repre-
sents getting .25 clicks at cost $0.80 by moving one’s
bid from 0.50 to $2.00.
We then regard these “pieces” as items in an in-
stance of fractional knapsack with value equal to the
incremental number of clicks and size equal to the
incremental cost. We emulate the greedy algorithm
for knapsack, sorting by cost-per-click, and choosing
greedily until the budget is exhausted. It is well-
known that in the optimal solution, at most one item
is chosen fractionally. Choosing an item fractionally
in this situation corresponds to bidding randomly be-
tween the two bid values that define the line segment.
In this reduction to knapsack we have ignored the
fact that some of the pieces come from the same query
and cannot be treated independently. However, since
each curve is concave, the pieces that come from a
particular query curve are in increasing order of cost-
per-click; thus from each query we have chosen for
our “knapsack” a set of pieces that form a prefix of
the curve. Hence for each query there is a bid (or
in one case a convex combination of two bids) that
exactly achieves cost and clicks equal to the sum of
the costs and clicks implied by the pieces.
Lemma 7 If the graph G is a matching, then the
greedy algorithm described above solves the Budget
Optimization problem exactly in polynomial time.
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B.2 A star graph. We next consider the case
when the graph G is a star, with only one keyword
node that is connected to every query node. In this
case we only make one bid, and that bid is applied
to all queries. This is equivalent to finding the best
uniform strategy in a general graph, and so can be
done in polynomial time by Lemma 2.
B.3 A disjoint union of star graphs. Combin-
ing the results of the previous two sections, we have
an algorithm for the Budget Optimization prob-
lem for the case when G is a disjoint union of star
graphs. For each star, if the center of the star is a
keyword, we form the aggregate landscape for that
star, as in the previous section. If the center of a star
is a query, we just pick one of the keywords arbitrar-
ily and delete the edges to the remaining keywords.
After this transformation, we have a matching, and
can apply Lemma 7
Lemma 8 If the graph G is a disjoint union of star
graphs, then it can be transformed into an matching
problem with aggregate landscapes and solved exactly
in polynomial time.
B.4 Laminar structure in graphs. We now con-
sider several cases where the graph has a laminar
structure. As we shall see, this structure will allow us
to impose a (partial) ordering on the possible bid val-
ues, and thereby give pseudopolynomial algorithms
via dynamic programming.
Before doing this, we show that to solve the Bud-
get Optimization problem (for general graphs) op-
timally in pseudopolynomial time, it suffices to pro-
vide an algorithm that solves the deterministic case.
Lemma 9 Let I be an input to the Budget Opti-
mization problem and suppose that we find the op-
timal deterministic solution for every possible budget
U ′ ≤ U . Then we can find the optimal solution in
time O(U logU).
Proof: Let traffic(U ′) be the optimal number of clicks
given a budget of U ′. We can think of the pair
(U ′, traffic(U ′)) as a point on a landscape, with cost
U ′ and clicks traffic(U ′). Properties analogous to
those in Observation 1 now apply to the set V =
{(U ′, traffic(U ′)) : U ′ ≤ U}, i.e. cost and clicks
are non-decreasing, as is cost per click. We can
thus apply Lemma 1 to show that the optimal dis-
tribution consists of 2 points on the convex hull of
this landscape. Finding the convex hull takes time
O(U logU)[10].
Given a collection of n sets S1, . . . , S2, we say that
S is nested if S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Sn. We say that S is
laminar if, for any two sets Si and Sj , if Si ∩ Sj 6= ∅
then either Si ⊆ Sj or Sj ⊆ Si.
Given a keyword interaction graph G, we associate
a set of neighboring queries Qk = {q : (k, q) ∈ E}
with each keyword k. If this collection of sets is
nested, we say that the graph has the nested prop-
erty and if the collection of sets if laminar, we say
that the graph has the laminar property.
The following lemma will be useful for giving a
structure to the optimal solution, and will allow a
dynamic programming approach to go through.
We call a solution deterministic if it consists of one
bid vector, rather than a general distribution over bid
vectors.
Lemma 10 For keywords i, j ∈ K, if Qi ⊆ Qj then
there exists an optimal deterministic solution to the
Budget Optimization problem with ai ≥ aj .
Proof: Assume that some optimal solution had ai <
aj . Because we assign queries to the highest incident
keyword, all queries in Qi are assigned either to key-
word j at bid level aj or to some other keyword j
′ at
bid level greater than aj . Therefore, we can increase
ai to be equal to aj without changing the effective
bid of any keyword.
B.4.1 Nested Sets. We first consider the case
when the sets Qi of queries are nested, with Q1 ⊆
Q2 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Qn. Note that by Lemma 10, we can
assume that the bids are ordered with a1 ≥ a2 ≥
· · · ≥ an, and further, the set of queries that will be
assigned to keyword i is exactly the set Qi \ Qi−1.
We can, therefore, given a keyword i and a bid ai,
compute an incremental spend and traffic associated
with bidding ai on keyword i, that is
tˆ(i,ai) =
∑
q∈Qi\Qi−1
clicksq(ai), and
sˆ(i,ai) =
∑
q∈Qi\Qi−1
costq(ai).
We define F [i, b, U ] to be the maximum number
of clicks achievable by bidding at least b on each of
keywords 1, . . . , i (and exactly b on keyword i) while
spending at most U . We now give a recurrence for
F [i, b, U ] by considering all possible minimum bids
and budgets for the set of keywords 1, . . . , i− 1. For
each such choice, we consider bidding b on keyword
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i yielding some number of incremental clicks and in-
cremental spend. If the incremental spend is at most
U −U ′, then we have a new candidate solution equal
to F [i − 1, b′, U ′] + tˆ(i, b). If the incremental spend
would exceed the budget then we return a 0. (We
also return a zero for the base case of i = 0. That is,
we have F [i, b, U ] =
max
b′≥b, U ′≤U
{F [i− 1, b′, U ′] + tˆ(i, b)} (5)
if (sˆ(i, b) ≤ U − U ′ and i > 0), and F [i, b, U ] = 0
otherwise.
Assuming that budgets take on integer values of at
most U and bids take on integer values of at most B,
we have the following
Lemma 11 If the graph G has the nesting property,
then the dynamic programming recurrence in (5) finds
an optimal deterministic solution to the Budget Op-
timization problem exactly in O(B2U2n) time.
Proof: The table is of size nBU and each update
requires a max over BU values, each of which can be
computed in constant time.
Using standard rounding and grouping ideas, we
can compute an approximately optimal solution in
polynomial time. We omit the details, which are es-
sentially subsumed by the laminar set case below.
B.5 Laminar Sets. We can extend the ideas used
for graphs with the nesting property to graphs with
the laminar property. We still use Lemma 10 to re-
strict the bids on the sets. We can view the laminar
order as a tree with keyword j as a parent of keyword
i if Qj is the minimal set containing Qi. In this case
we say that j is a child of i. Given a keyword j with
c children i1, . . . , ic, we now need to enumerate over
all ways to allocate the budget among the children
and also over all possible minimum bids for the chil-
dren. A serious complication is that a node may have
many children and thus a term of U c would not even
be pseudopolynomial. We can solve this problem by
showing that given any laminar ordering, there is an
equivalent one in which each keyword has at most 2
children.
Lemma 12 , Let G be a graph with the laminar
property. There exists another graph G′ with the
same optimal solution to the Budget Optimization
problem, where each node has at most two children in
the laminar ordering. Furthermore, G′ has at most
twice as many nodes as G.
Proof: We will accomplish this transformation by
adding “dummy” keyword nodes. Suppose we have
two nodes i and j that are siblings in the tree,
with parent p. Now add a new keyword ℓ, with
Qℓ = Qi ∪Qj. Trivially, we must also have Qℓ ⊆ Qp,
andQℓ\(Qi∪Qj) = ∅. Now consider the optimal solu-
tion to our transformed problem. If aℓ ≥ min{ai,aj},
we can increase ai and/or aj to be equal to aℓ with-
out changing the effective bid on any of our queries.
We thus have established that aℓ ≤ min{ai,aj}, and
hence keyword ℓ does not get assigned any queries
and can be removed.
Given a graph with at most two children per node,
we can extend (5). We redefine F [i, b, U ] to be the
maximum number of clicks achievable by bidding at
least b on each of keywords j s.t. Qj ⊆ Qi (and
exactly b on keyword i) while spending at most U .
For this definition, we use Z(b, U) to denote set of
allowable bids and budgets over children:
Z(b, U) = {b,′ b′′, U ′, U ′′ : b′ ≥ b, U ′ ≤ U,
b′′ ≥ b, U ′′ ≤ U,U ′ + U ′′ ≤ U}
Now we define F [i, b, U ] as
max
b,′b′′,U′,U′′
∈Z(b,U)
{
F [j′, b′, U ′]+F [j′′, b′′, U ′′]+tˆ(Qi, b)
}
(6)
if (sˆ(Qi, b) ≤ U−U ′−U ′′ and i > 0), and F [i, b, U ] =
0 otherwise.
By a proof similar to that of Lemma 11, we have
Lemma 13 If the graph G has the laminar property,
then, after applying Lemma 12, the dynamic program-
ming recurrence in (6) finds an optimal deterministic
solution to the Budget Optimization problem ex-
actly in O(B3U3n) time.
In addition, we can apply Lemma 9 to compute
the optimal (randomized) solution. Observe that in
the dynamic program, we have already solved the in-
stance for every budget U ′ ≤ U , so we can find the
randomized solution with no additional asymptotic
overhead.
Lemma 14 If the graph G has the laminar property,
then, by applying Lemma 12, the dynamic program-
ming recurrence in (6), and Lemma 9, we can find
an optimal solution to the Budget Optimization
problem in O(B3U3n) time.
The bounds in this section make pessimistic as-
sumptions about having to try every budget and ev-
ery level. For many problems, you only need to
14
choose from a discrete set of bid levels (e.g., mul-
tiples of one cent). Doing so yields the obvious im-
provement in the bounds.
C Hardness
In this section we prove that the Budget Optimiza-
tion is strongly NP-hard, and that a generalization
of it is in fact (1− 1e )-hard.
C.1 Strong NP-hardness.
Theorem 15 The Budget Optimization problem
is strongly NP-hard.
Proof: (sketch) By reduction from Vertex Cover. Let
[H = (VH , EH), k
∗] be an instance of vertex cover,
where H is the graph and k∗ is the size of the vertex
cover. We make an interaction graph G = (K∪Q,E)
where |K| = |VH |, and we have Q = R ∪ S where
|R| = |EH | and |S| = |VH |. We make an edge
(k, q) ∈ E between k ∈ K and q ∈ R if (in H) the
vertex associated with k is incident to the edge as-
sociated with q. For the query set S we add edges
to make a matching between S and the keywords K.
To complete our instance of Budget Optimization
it remains to define landscapes for each query. For
the queries s ∈ S, we have two positions with ctrs
αs[1] = αs[2] = 1.0, and bids bs1 = $ǫ and b
s
2 = $1.
For queries r ∈ R we have one position with ctr
αr[1] = 1.0, and there is one bid br1 = $1. We set
the budget equal to (|VH | − k∗)ǫ+ |EH |+ k∗.
We claim that there is a vertex cover of size k∗ if
and only if there is a solution to this instance that
achieves |EH |+ |VH | clicks.
For the forward direction, we bid $1 on every key-
word associated with a vertex in the cover, and $ǫ on
every other vertex. We win the click on every query
in S, and since this is a vertex cover, we win the click
on every query in R, for a total of |EH |+ |VH | clicks.
Our cost is $1 for each r ∈ R, $1 for each s ∈ S in-
cident to a keyword associated with a vertex in the
cover, and $ǫ for all other s ∈ S, for a total of exactly
the budget.
For the backward direction, we note that the total
number of clicks available is |EH |+ |VH | and thus all
of them must be won. This implies that the keywords
on which we bid $1 must form a cover of the graphH .
The total cost incurred by these keywords is |EH |+k′,
where k′ is the size of the cover. Making ǫ small
enough (say |EH |−2), we see that we must get k′ ≤ k∗
in order to remain within budget.
C.2 Hardness of approximation (with click
values). Suppose we introduce weights on the
queries that indicate the relative value of a click from
the various search users. Formally, we have weights
wq for all q ∈ Q and our goal is maximize the to-
tal weighted traffic given a budget. Call this the
Weighted Keyword Bidding problem.
With this additional generalization we can show
hardness of approximation via a simple reduction
from the Maximum Coverage problem, which is
know to be (1 − 1/e)-hard [5]. In this problem you
are given a collection S1, . . . , Sm of sets over [n] and
a number k∗, and you are asked to find a set I ⊂ [m]
of size k∗ that maximizes | ∪i∈I Si|, the number of
covered items.
Theorem 16 The Weighted Keyword Bidding
problem is hard to approximate to within (1 − 1/e).
Proof: (sketch) By approximation-preserving reduc-
tion from Maximum Coverage. Given an instance
[(S1, . . . , Sm), k
∗] of Maximum Coverage, we cre-
ate an instance of Weighted Keyword Bidding
with |K| = m, and Q = R ∪ S, where |R| = n
and |S| = m. We create s correspondence between
keywords k ∈ K and sets Si, and one between
queries q ∈ R and found elements e ∈ [n]. Now,
if Si ∋ e, then we connect the corresponding key-
word and query. We also add a matching between
keywords in K and queries in S. This defines the
keyword graph. For the queries q ∈ R, there is one
position with α[1] = 1.0, and one bidder bidding $1.
Additionally, we set wq = 1. For the queries q ∈ S,
there is one position with α[1] = n2, and one bid-
der bidding $1.11 For these queries we set the weight
wq = 0. The budget is set to k
∗n2 + n.
It is simple to show that an algorithm that can
approximate this instance of Weighted Keyword
Bidding to within γ also approximates the Maxi-
mum Coverage instance to within γ.
11To simulate a ctr of n2 we could make n2 identical copies
of the query each with ctr 1.0
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